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1. Justification of the topic 
 
Innovation is an important moving force behind today’s modern, knowledge-driven, 
information economy. Day after day new products, production processes are being invented 
and implemented at companies, which promise greater profit for the company and enhanced 
satisfaction of needs for the consumers. 
The generation of new technological knowledge and the implementation of inventions, 
however, is not always smooth. The creation of new technological knowledge requires high 
costs, copying it, however, costs next to nothing (especially in case of codifiable, explicit 
knowledge). Is it possible, is it practical to block the free diffusion of technological 
knowledge? 
There is a conflict of interests between the innovator and society. The innovator would 
like to have some advantage over the competitors in return for the high costs and many years 
spent researching a new product or technology. He would like to have monopoly power over 
the innovation to appropriate its returns. The competitors would prefer the newly born 
technology to be freely accessible to everyone, since thereby all could produce a better 
product with more efficient technologies paying only the low cost of reproducing the 
knowledge. The consumers also would find the quick and universal diffusion of the new 
knowledge advantageous, attaining higher satisfaction from consuming the goods produced in 
better quality or at a lower price. Knowledge is a source of positive externalities, thus, from 
the point of view of society one could argue that its free availability would increase 
efficiency. Free access to new technologies, their treatment as public goods would tempt to 
free riding, ruining the incentives for potential innovators to bear the high costs of research 
and development. 
Scientific study, along with research and development have their intrinsic rewards to 
some extent. Researchers or companies achieving new scientific results become famous, their 
professional reputation increases, it can even grant them extra income. Innovating companies 
can have a head start over their competitors for some length of time. In some industries, 
however, more then these is needed to resolve the above mentioned conflict of interests. 
Especially in industries like medical equipments, biotechnology or pharmaceuticals (Arora et 
al 2008) patents as institutional methods of creating private property rights over newly 
generated technological knowledge are an important way of incentivizing research and 
development. „Patents are licenses for a monopoly over information” (Nordhaus 1967, p.1.). 
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Transforming knowledge as quasi-public good into a private good through the 
institution of patenting is a long standing concept in economics. After the seminal analyses of 
Machlup (1958) and Arrow (1962) a line of study analyzing patents systematically on neo-
classical foundations started out following Nordhaus (1967). The purpose of the new research 
program called theory of optimal patents is to determine the socially optimal length of patent 
protection, the life of the patent. The government has to set the patent term, taking into 
account the profit maximizing behavior of the innovating companies to balance the static 
efficiency losses (that are immediate and have their effects temporarily in the nearer future) 
and dynamic efficiency gains (that apply only in the longer run, in the more distant future).   
The immediate but temporary efficiency loss attributable to awarding patent protection 
is due to it distorting the market. The introducer of the innovation will enjoy a monopoly 
position on the market in question for a certain time (either by producing an innovative new 
product, or by being able to produce an already existing product with a more efficient 
technology), and the resulting price above marginal cost is a known source of deadweight 
loss. Its necessity is justified by the fact that without the promise of this monopoly power the 
innovator would not spend resources on research and development, and the innovation would 
not be made at all. The new, innovative product or process promises in turn after the 
expiration of the patent protection an increased consumers’ surplus: this is its long run 
efficiency gain. 
The optimization task for economic policy-makers is to determine how long of a wait on 
the part of the consumers for this prospective future gain justifies how large a market power 
for the producer, and that in turn will induce them to what level of research and development 
to produce technological knowledge. 
A central notion of the dissertation is the strength of patent protection. In the theoretical 
study of Nordhaus, this is simply the length or life of the patent that can be set to be optimal 
depending on variables like the cost reduction attributable to the innovation (the importance 
of the innovation), the price elasticity of the demand function or the interest rate. As a result 
of his model he finds that the patent term can be long (as long as 25-30 years) in case of the 
most trivial innovations, for important ones on the other hand it should be very short (1-1,5 
years) (Nordhaus 1967, p.29.). The patent system is most often more complex than this, and 
its strength is determined by other factors such as the breadth of the patent protection, whether 
there is compulsory licensing or what can be patented at all. 
If we look at the impact the institution of patents bears on innovation from the global 
perspective of interconnected national economies, we should interpret these welfare losses 
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and gains more broadly. Since there is no such thing as a world patent, only different national 
patent protection regimes of various strength, it is useless to search for the globally optimal 
patent design. While the individual countries’ national patent regimes strive to promote 
innovation within the given country, they can also encourage the diffusion of innovation from 
abroad. If a foreign innovator finds that his intellectual property rights are appropriately 
protected in another country as well, he might be more willing to make the innovation or the 
innovative product available in that county also. 
In my dissertation I study the influence that the strength of the patent protection regime 
has on the one hand on the creation of innovations within a closed economy, and on the other 
hand on diffusion of innovations between open economies. 
 
2. Aims of research and hypotheses 
 
The dissertation aims to extend the literature on the impacts of patent strength with two 
hitherto neglected factors. 
The first of these factors fits into the theory of optimal patents, but extends it with a 
behavioural economic viewpoint. In the theory of optimal patents the government has to 
evaluate welfare gains and losses that are realized at different times and by different actors to 
balance the immediate and long run welfare effects of an innovation against each other in 
setting the optimal patent term. Following Fischer (1930) and Samuelson (1937), economists 
automatically use capital budgeting techniques based on exponential time discounting for 
such comparisons: expected future costs and benefits of long-term projects are converted to 
present value using the exponential discount function, making costs and benefits realized in 
different time periods commensurate. 
Behavioural economics have voiced critiques against this discounting model (Ainslie 
1992, Loewenstein – Prelec 1992). In experiments they found that intertemporal choices of 
test subjects can better be described using a different discounting model: a hyperbolic or 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Decision-makers exhibit increasing patience in time: in the 
short run they are more impatient, while in the long run, they are more patient than an 
exponentially discounting decision-maker would be. In my dissertation I wish to incorporate 
this time-dependent patience into the theory of optimal patents and answer the first two 
research questions: 
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1. How can non-exponential discounting models be used to determine the time value of 
flows of income(utility), and how do present- or future values calculated with these 
models relate to present- or future values calculated using exponential discounting? 
 
2. If the discounting behaviour of consumers can better be described by non-exponential 
models, then how does the greater short run impatience and long run patience implied 
in these models influence the socially optimal patent term to be set by the government?  
 
If we universally apply the exponential discounting model to consumers’ choices, we 
will get misleading result, since the exponential model under- or overvalues gains and losses 
at different points in time, relative to the consumers’ non-exponential, mental discounting. 
This difference in valuation will be even more empathic for flows of income(utility) over a 
longer period of time. If we, on the other hand, would apply the non-exponential discounting 
universally for capital budgeting it would result in conflicts, since due to the dynamic 
inconsistency characteristic for these models investors would not carry out tomorrow the 
plans they made today. 
In the dissertation I argue that in certain decision situations it is reasonable to use a 
combination of the two models. The theory of optimal patents is one such field of decision 
situations. Combining the two models is reasonable on the one hand because costs and 
benefits associated with patent protection can be divided into two qualitatively different parts. 
One share of the costs and benefits are real monetary outlays and incomes for a company 
(research and development costs, production cost reduction due to the innovation and 
increased profit due to the monopoly power of the patent holder), while another share is only 
“virtual”, mental gain in the sense that it cannot be deposited on a bank account at an interest 
and also cannot be used as a collateral for a loan (this is the increased consumers’ surplus 
resulting in the long run from the innovation). Because this divisibility and qualitative 
difference, in case of the former one should continue using exponential discounting, while in 
case of the latter, one should rather apply non-exponential discounting models. On the other 
hand, combining the two methods is also possible, since the consumers, to whom the non-
exponential discounting is applied, are not the ones making the decision about the patent term, 
thus the dynamic inconsistency characteristic of the non-exponential models do not cause 
problem. 
A second factor with which the dissertation wishes to extend the existing literature can 
be analyzed within the realm of international economics, assuming an open economy. 
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In the literature whenever the impact of patent protection strength is investigated, it is 
investigated through its effect on international flow of products or capital. The relationship 
between the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection regimes and bilateral 
trade flows has been investigated in the literature in various ways by many authors in theory, 
using models (Chin – Grossman 1988, Deardorff 1992, Ivus 2011). Two main effects are 
identified determining this relationship: the market expansion effect and the market power 
effect. A given innovative company is only encouraged to enter the foreign market in some 
way (be it a joint venture, foreign direct investment or in the most simple case just plain 
exporting) if its property rights to its innovation are appropriately protected in the other 
country. A new market means a new possibility for the knowledge embodied in the innovative 
product to leak: the company has to evaluate if this risk is worth taking. Market expansion 
effect means that due to the strong foreign IPR protection the innovator has the opportunity to 
get monopoly profit on a greater market than before. The market expansion effect induces the 
innovator to increase exports. The second effect, the market power effect means, that the 
strong IPR protection not only increases the market, but also makes it less price-sensitive. 
Stronger protection means smaller probability of imitation, and smaller risk to the exporter. 
This will in turn induce the innovative exporter to increase price and decrease export. All the 
models assume, that the IPR protection at home is constant, thus these models can not analyze 
how a change in the strength of the home IPR regime affects the export decision of the 
company. 
 
3. How does a change in the strength of the IPR protection regime in the home country 
influence the export decision of an innovative company? 
 
To investigate this, a model has to be able to quantify the strength of the home IPR 
regime as well as that of the foreign country. In the dissertation I argue that the important 
factor influencing the export decision is the relation between the strengths of the IPR regimes 
in the two trading countries, and the change in this relation. To quantify this relation, I 
introduce the notion of relative IPR strength, as a quotient of the indices measuring IPR 
strength in the two countries, and also the change in this proportion. This relative IPR strength 
can signify many different relationships between the IPR regimes of two trading parties. If the 
exporting country is a developed county while the importing country is a less developed one, 
the relative IPR strength in the importing country is generally less than one, meaning that 
intellectual property rights are less strictly protected in the importing country than they are in 
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the exporting country. Changes in the strength of protection (it becoming stricter or more lax) 
are now possible in both countries. Although there is a general tendency of IPR protection 
measures becoming stricter in every country, a different degree of strengthening in the two 
countries will result in different changes in the relative IPR strength. If IPR protections 
becomes more strict in both countries, but to a greater degree in the less developed importing 
country, then the importing country’s relative IPR strength increased: the importing country is 
catching up with the exporting country. If it is the other way around, and the degree of 
strengthening in the less developed county is smaller, then the importing country’s relative 
IPR strength decreased and the importing country is falling behind the exporting country. 
 
4. How is the export decision of a developed country exporter company influenced by the 
relative IPR strength of another country, and the change thereof? 
 
In the model I developed in the dissertation the ceteris paribus strengthening IPR 
protection in any of the trading partner countries decreases the probability of imitation of the 
innovative product thereby encouraging the developed country exporter to enter the foreign 
market with less complex products that are less difficult to imitate technically. Introducing 
less complex products in the foreign market means increasing the range of products in the 
high-tech and low-tech industries to a different degree. 
The model developed leads to an empirically testable hypothesis that can be put forward 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: A change in the relative IPR strength increases import to a greater degree in 
high-tech products relative to low-tech product in importing countries catching up 
than in importing countries falling behind.    
 
To test the hypothesis I used bilateral trading data of 32 developed exporter and 80 less 
developed importer countries in total from two 5-years time intervals among high-tech, 
medium-tech and low-tech products. Creating country-pairs from the trading parties we can 
always determine whether any one specific importer is catching up or falling behind any one 
specific exporter, based on change in relative IPR strength. The statistical method of 
difference in differences allows us to test whether the two groups of country-pairs exhibit 
significantly different trade patterns. 
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3. Structure of the dissertation and methods used 
 
The central topic of the dissertation is the strength of patent protection and its effects. 
The linking concept in the dissertation is that patent protection is an official license issued by 
a government to an innovator enabling him to monopolize a certain technological knowledge 
(embodied in a better product or a more efficient production process). I investigate two 
distinct effects of patent protection. One of this plays a role in a closed economy, and it is in 
connection with the generation of technological knowledge. The other can only be interpreted 
in an open economy, and it is connected to the international diffusion of technological 
knowledge. These two effects are investigated within a strictly restricted framework. 
In the first chapter I try to shed light on the connecting points of knowledge, innovation 
and patent from a wide viewing angle. Providing an overview of the whole innovation 
literature is certainly not an aim of the thesis, since researchers of innovation use various 
different approaches to innovation and its effects on companies and national economies. Not 
all of these approaches use explicitly the institutional variable I want to study: the patent 
protection and its effects on innovation. 
The innovation literature often uses models to better understand and describe presumed 
relationships. The impacts of patent protection can also be quantified and studied through 
models, even if sometimes using very restrictive assumptions. The starting point of the second 
chapter is the theory of optimal patents starting out from Nordhaus. This approach has strong 
neo-classical foundations and studies the effects the institutional variable of patent protection 
bears on innovative resource allocation of companies and on the welfare gains of society 
generated by innovations. The theory of optimal patents use a highly simplified model 
(perfect competition, downward sloping linear demand curves, constant marginal cost of 
production, decreasing returns in research and development, etc.) to describe how the 
government should set the life of patents in a way that it induces profit maximizing potential 
innovator companies that take this preset patent life as given, to allocate just as much 
resources to R&D that is necessary to achieve maximal social return. Modifications to the 
original optimal patent framework allows for relaxing some of the restricting assumptions 
(competition in R&D, sequential innovations, costly imitation, transaction costs in patent 
protection enforcement etc.), incorporating alternative mechanisms of protecting 
technological knowledge (trade secrets, lead time, prizes) and adding more dimensions to the 
patent design (patent breadth, compulsory licensing etc.). 
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In the third chapter I incorporate the positive model of quasi-hyperbolic (non-
exponential) discounting from behavioural economics into the normative model of optimal 
patents. The normative, neo-classical optimalization model of optimal patents is extended 
after the institutional variable also with a behavioural aspect. Again, the question this chapter 
seeks to answer is how the government should set the life of the patent (this will be the only 
measure of the stringency of the patent system in this chapter) so that it induces the profit 
maximizing companies to the socially optimal innovation, taking into account the non-
exponential discounting behaviour of the consumers. 
The first three chapters studied how the strength of patent protection affects the 
production of technological knowledge. In the last two chapters I use an open economy 
setting, and the question is how the strength of patent protection affects the international 
diffusion of technological knowledge, in particular, only the portion of it that happens through 
the international flow of trade in products. In these chapters I will regard the innovations and 
knowledge as already existing, the question is only whether the owner of the knowledge (the 
patent holder) transfers it to a foreign country by exporting the product protected by the patent 
or the product that is produced by a protected technology, and thereby also incurs the risk of 
imitation in a foreign country. 
In the fourth chapter I build a static partial equilibrium model concentrating on the 
individual company’s exporting decision. I explore how bilateral trade is influenced by the 
importing country’s relative IPR strength. Inter-country trade is explored by extending the 
north-south trade model. 
The fifth chapter continues to investigate the role patents play in knowledge diffusion, 
with an empirical study. In this chapter I employ the statistical method of difference in 
differences, which composes groups along multiple dimensions from the basic population and 
establishes if there is a significant difference in the behaviour of the different groups. 
Composing country-pairs from countries that engage in trade with each other a basic 
distinctive criterion among the country pairs is the change in the importer’s relative IPR 
strength, according to which criterion the country pairs are divided into importers catching up 
with or falling behind of the exporter. Another dimension was the change in the value of trade 
in different industry groups (high tech, medium tech and low tech). In this chapter it 
constituted an important task to actually measure the absolute and relative strength of IPR 
regimes for different country pairs. The stringency of the IPR regimes in any given country 
can be measured by an index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997), which is a much more 
pragmatic measure than the abstract variables that models use for this purpose (which is 
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sometimes only the length of the patent protection, sometimes a combination of patent length 
and breadth and sometimes a not specified complex variable describing a whole IPR regime). 
A country’s relative IPR strength is defined as a quotient of the Ginarte-Park indices of the 
trading parties, the change in relative strength is thus the change in time of this ratio. Bilateral 
trade data are from the UN Comtrade data bank, the classification of countries along national 
income is done according to the data available from the World Bank, and relative catching up 
or falling behind is calculated using the latest Ginarte-Park indices for the countries available 
at the website of Walter G. Park. 
 
4. Summary of the results 
 
(1)  Extension of the quasi-hyperbolic model, and its application to the calculation of time 
value for flows of income(utility). 
 
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model has not hitherto been applied to the calculation 
of present values for flows of income(utility). 
In a typical experimental setting to establish non-exponential discounting behaviour 
researchers study what immediate reward is equivalent to a given reward of a given delay 
(matching), or which of a smaller-sooner reward or a larger-later reward a given test subject 
would choose (choice). Based on such experiments, behavioral economists pointed out that 
decision makers repeatedly choose contrary to what exponential discounting would predict, 
and that their actual discounting behaviour can better be described by other types of discount 
functions (Thaler 1981, Loewenstein – Prelec 1992). Non-exponential discounters exhibit 
greater short run impatience but also greater long run patience, relative to an exponential 
discounter. This means, that exponential discounting will overvalue in the short run, but 
undervalue in the long run. One can identify a point in time when the exponential and non-
exponential discount factors equal each other: this time will come later the greater the short 
run impatience, and/or the smaller the long run patience. 
Experiments, however, always involved a comparison of (or choice between) single 
payoffs of different value due at different points in time. In the dissertation I apply the 
experiment-based non-exponential models to evaluate flows of income due during a longer 
period of time (perpetuity or deferred perpetuity). 
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The present value of a perpetuity discounted with the quasi-hyperbolic model is greater 
relative to its present value discounted with the exponential model the smaller the short run 
impatience or the greater the long run patience of the quasi-hyperbolic discounter. 
For deferred perpetuities (which is, flows of utility starting from a later point of time 
and due until eternity) one can determine a point in time so that a perpetuity starting earlier 
than that time will have a higher present value discounted exponentially than quasi-
hyperbolically. This point in time directly proportional to the short run impatience but 
inversely proportional to the long run patience. 
My results have been published in the following scientific publication: 
Nagy Benedek (2010) Hyperbolic Discounting and Economic Policy. Review of Economic 
Perspectives, 3., 71-86. o. 
 
(2)  Incorporating the present values of utility flows calculated using quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting into the theory of optimal patents. 
 
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model which is established by behavioral economics 
to be more psychologically realistic has not yet been applied to the theory of optimal patents. 
Based on the previous results I incorporated the method of calculating present values for 
deferred perpetuities using the quasi-hyperbolic discounting into the model of optimal patents. 
An innovation results in increased consumers’ surplus for the consumers once the patent 
protection has expired and the technology has become freely available to everyone. This 
increased consumers’ surplus is treated in the optimal patent models as a deferred utility-
perpetuity, thus one can apply quasi-hyperbolic discounting when calculating its present 
value. My model shows a qualitative difference between the optimal patent life L
*
 calculated 
using exponential discounting and the optimal patent life L
** 
calculated using the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model so that L
*
 > L
**
. The difference is qualitative meaning the 
magnitude or even the direction of the difference between the two can not be attributable to 
the long run discount rate used for the quasi-hyperbolic model (rh)  being lower than that of 
the exponential model (re). This is true even if the parameter used in the quasi-hyperbolic 
model to account for greater short run impatience (β) is ultimately absent from the formula 
determining the optimal patent life. When rh approaches re  from below, the optimal patent 
life calculated with the quasi-hyperbolic model approaches that calculated with the 
exponential model, so that L
*
 = L
**
 when rh = re. This is because the exponential case is a 
limiting case of the quasi-hyperbolic. This does not hold in the opposite direction: when re 
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approaches rh  from above, even if rh = re, L
*
 > L
**
 will still hold. If our optimal patent life 
model takes into account the mental discounting of the consumers, the optimal life of the 
patent will be shorter than if exponential discounting is assumed of the consumers. 
The interpretation of the results lies in the consumer quasi-hyperbolically discounting 
welfare gains realizing in the distant future to a lesser degree than an exponential discounter, 
thus the exponential model overvalues welfare gains in the near future and undervalues gains 
in the distant future. According to the model, decreasing the patent term will push the time of 
innovation later, but brings the expiry of the patent protection earlier. Decreasing the patent 
term will be socially beneficial if the consumers in reality discount the short run welfare 
losses due to the later innovation to a smaller extent, and the long run welfare gains due to 
sooner patent expiry to a greater extent than exponential discounting would suggest. 
Later it can be interesting to incorporate these alternative discounting models in more 
sophisticated models, or quantify the welfare losses resulting from non-optimal patent term 
for these models as well. Incorporating them in other optimal patent models can prove how 
robust my results are. 
The theory of optimal patents is but one of many possible fields of application. The 
optimalization problem I discuss in my dissertation is a part of a larger class of problems, the 
so called Ramsey-problems. In these problems the government tries to set an optimal value of 
some parameter to achieve maximal social welfare under certain restricting constraints. 
Similar to what I have done, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting can be incorporated in models 
of optimal tax policy or the regulation of congestible goods. 
 My results have been published in the following scientific publication: 
Nagy Benedek (2012c) A kvázi-hiperbolikus diszkontálás alkalmazása az optimális 
szabadalmak elméletében. Szigma, 1-2., 37-58. o. 
 
(3) Introducing the notion of relative IPR strength and its incorporation into the literature 
studying the relationship between patent protection and international trade flows. 
 
In the literature studying how the patent system affects international trade the relative 
IPR strength of trading parties have not yet been used. 
In my dissertation I develop a static partial equilibrium north-south trade model, in 
which an export decision of an innovative company is influenced not only by the strength of 
the patent protection in the foreign country, but also the strength of this protection in the home 
country. 
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The possible imitation of an innovative product is determined by two things in my 
model: the technical and legal possibility to copy and market a product. In the model, the 
technical possibility to imitate depends on the complexity of the product: the more complex 
the product, the more difficult it is to imitate. The patent system is introduced into the model 
as a means to restrict the legal possibility to imitate an innovative product. In this sense of the 
word it can be paralleled with the patent breadth as it is used in the theory of optimal patents. 
In the model, every level of legal protection determines a marginal imitation risk, showing 
what technical imitation risk is worth for the innovator to take, given the risk of the legal 
possibility of imitation; which are the least difficult products to imitate he should export to the 
foreign country. When patent protection gets stricter, the probability of a successful imitation 
of the given innovative product (or technology embodied therein) decreases, encouraging the 
company to bring even technically more easily imitable products to the foreign country: 
marginal imitation risk increases. The model shows that the exporter might be willing to 
export more even with constant foreign patent protection strictness if protection is getting 
stricter in the home country. The simultaneous strengthening of the foreign protection 
increases his willingness to export even further. 
If foreign patent protection is less strict both before and after the change than in the 
home country, but it gets stricter to a greater degree then the less developed country’s relative 
IPR strength increases, it catches up with the developed exporting country. If a less strict 
foreign patent protection both before and after the change is combined with a lesser degree of 
strengthening, then the importing country’s relative IPR strength decreases, it falls behind the 
developed exporting country. Both the importing country’s catching up and falling behind has 
the same direction of effect on the export decision of the exporting country’s innovative 
company, only the magnitude is different. A given absolute strengthening of patent protection 
in the less developed country increases the marginal imitation risk more, if the less developed 
county is catching up with its trading partner than when it falls behind it, regarding relative 
IPR strength. 
Increasing marginal imitation risk affects the scope of products worth exporting 
differently in different industries. In my model I divided the high tech and low tech products. 
Within the high tech industries, the share of more complex and therefore technically less 
easily imitable products is higher, while for the low tech industries a larger share of the 
products is less complex and technically more easily imitable. Increasing marginal imitation 
risk will first increase export in the high tech industries, then later in the low tech industries. 
Thus, if catching up and relative strengthening of the importing country’s IPR protection 
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increases the marginal imitation risk to a smaller extent, it should affect high tech products 
more. Falling behind then, by increasing marginal imitation risk to a greater extent will affect 
trade in low tech products more. 
My results have been published in the following scientific publication: 
Nagy Benedek (2009a) IPR Protection Strength and the Market for Knowledge. In Bajmócy 
Zoltán – Lengyel Imre (eds.) Regional Competitiveness, Innovation and Environment. 
JATEPress, Szeged, 183-197. o. 
Nagy Benedek (2009b) The Strength of Intellectual Property Protection and the Transfer of 
Technologies. Annals of Faculty of Engineering Hunedoara, 3., 61-65. o. 
Fenyővári Zsolt – Nagy Benedek (2008b) A tulajdonjogok szerepe a szellemi erőforrások 
piacán. In A gazdasági környezet és a vállalati stratégiák, a IX. ipar- és 
vállalatgazdasági konferencia előadásai. Szeged, 260-268. o. 
 
(4)  Examining bilateral trade flows depending on the change of relative IPR strength 
 
To test the predictions of the model built in the dissertation, I investigated the effects of 
catching up or falling behind in terms of relative IPR strength using country pairs of 
developed exporter and less developed importer countries. The hypothesis stating that export 
of high tech products will increase more than low tech products with the increase of relative 
IPR strength for importers catching up than for importers falling behind can neither be 
rejected nor be accepted. I used multiple specifications to test the hypothesis, and whenever 
significant difference between the country groups (countries catching up versus countries 
falling behind) and industries (high tech versus low tech) could be identified it was in 
accordance with the hypothesis. From a total of 2520 cases, the difference in differences were 
found to be statistically significant at the 10% level in 672 cases (26,4% of total cases). 
I divided the industries into three groups: high tech, low tech and medium tech 
industries. I compared change in trade value between these groups, then I pooled the high and 
medium tech, then the medium and low tech industries to compare changes in trade value 
with the remaining group. The high tech and the low tech industries are those that exhibit 
significant difference the most times (266 cases) between countries that catch up and 
countries that fall behind. High tech and medium tech comparisons resulted less times in 
significant differences (205 cases), but changes in trade value for medium tech and low tech 
product resulted the least times in significant differences (only 103 cases). Medium tech 
industries seem to be more similar to low tech than to high tech industries. 
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I carried out the study for two periods of time (1995-2000 and 2000-2005) and also for 
the pooled data. The first of the two time periods was more successful (resulting in significant 
differences in 317 cases), and the second period was the least successful, whereas the pooled 
data showed 147 cases of significant difference. 
Based on the research we could say that high tech product export grew more than low 
tech product export to countries that catch up with their developed trading partners relative to 
those that fall behind their developed trading partners, in respect of relative IPR strength. 
Changing the scope of exporter and importer countries to enter the sample based on 
their income levels, in most cases (220) a significant difference can be shown if the exporters 
are only those with high income while exporters can include countries with low, lower middle 
or upper middle income levels. If we exclude upper middle income importers, we will only 
find statistically significant differences in 173 cases. If we modify the original specification 
by including the upper middle income exporters, 157 cases of significant difference results. 
Making both the exclusion and the inclusion simultaneously the number of cases where 
significant differences are found fall back to 122 cases. 
Both the model and the empirical study suggest that relative catching up and falling 
behind as a determinant of trade flows is a promising future line of research. It is important to 
identify further factors of influence (how to measure imitation ability, absorptive capacity, 
how to handle income disparities). The impact of changes in relative IPR strength can be 
investigated for specific groups of countries or other channels of knowledge diffusion (like 
FDI) as well. 
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